the time of Scalia's death in early 2016, it was clear that Heller had not brought either exactly what they had hoped. Instead, the Heller legacy included heightened controversy over Second Amendment originalism, interpretations of Heller by lower courts that drew heavily on the limits to gun ownership recognised by the majority, an increasingly bitter political divide over the meaning of the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to hear argument (to "grant certiorari") in subsequent gun rights cases.
3 As the Court's most vocal defender of originalist judicial philosophy and the individual right to bear arms, Justice Scalia was a significant part of recent Second Amendment history: his passing represents a symbolic moment in Second Amendment jurisprudence. This article explores the surprising and unexpected legal legacy of Heller from the Court's ruling to Scalia's death. It argues that the legal, historical, and political reaction to the Court's handling of originalism ultimately weakened its usefulness in the Second Amendment context. This required gun rights advocates to seek new arguments, shifting the nature of the debate. At the same time, while Heller upheld an individual right it also recognised limits to that right, opening new areas of debate that gun rights and gun control advocates could use to support their position. Both developments shifted the political debate about guns and complicated the legal arguments about the Second Amendment. But just as guidance from the Court became necessary, the shifting legal and political debate worked to keep the Court away, leading to further confusion and division. Thus, far from resolving the debate over the Second Amendment, Heller ultimately deepened it. Irrespective of any changes to the Court's jurisprudence in the wake of the appointment of Scalia's successor to the Court, the history of the debate about the Second Amendment in the years between Heller and the death of the opinion's author is important for understanding both the contemporary debate about guns in the US and the history of the Court and the Second Amendment. 
The Battle Over Originalism
5 In the pages of Heller played out one of the most significant Court-related culture wars battles: that of constitutional interpretation. The growth of conservatism in the late 1960s and 1970s was built, in part, on conservative criticism of rulings by the Warren Court which massively expanded the rights of the individual against the power of the state. Particularly unhappy with rulings that protected the rights of criminal suspects, conservatives turned to an older debate. The counter-majoritarian difficulty, a term coined by Alexander Bickel in his 1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch, described the problem of an unelected Court in a democratic system, arguing that judicial review was illegitimate since it undermined the power and authority of democratically-elected lawmakers.
v Such anti-democratic dangers were only compounded, conservatives argued, when activist judges interpreted the text of the Constitution in ways seemingly unsupported by the text or history. Accepting judicial review as an established part of the constitutional system, conservatives including Richard Nixon argued that judges should be committed to "judicial restraint."
vi Such individuals should remain committed to the text of the Constitution and not seek to expand it into areas and subjects upon which it did not speak. Judicial restraint would thus limit the anti-democratic implications of the counter-majoritarian difficulty and ensure rulings politically favourable to conservatives.
or the role of precedent, did little to roll back the implications and effects of liberal judicial rulings. Beginning in the late 1970s, conservatives developed the theory of original intent, a methodology that asserted that the meaning of the Constitution was to be found in the intent of those who created it. vii Alternative methods of interpretation which asserted the Constitution was a living document whose principles needed to be adapted to changing times and circumstances, were simply the counter-majoritarian difficulty in another form. The only democratically legitimate way to understand the Constitution was in the terms with which the Founders would have been familiar. Originalism offered supporters not only the justification of a direct link to the thoughts of the nation's founders, but a justification for conservative judicial activism in overturning precedent: if past rulings did not fit with an originalist understanding they could be overturned and on grounds other than preferred policy outcomes.
viii Influenced in part by the application of the methods of social history to legal and constitutional history, however, historians and legal scholars began to see problems in seeking the "intent" of the Framers. Scholarly criticism of the methods of original intent led to the development of what came to be known as "original public meaning."
ix The approach placed less emphasis on the intentions of those who created the Constitution and more on the way in which the provisions would have been understood by ordinary Americans at the time. Judges remain constrained by the historical meaning of the constitutional provision, but without the methodological difficulties that inhered in original intent.
7 Original public meaning dominated Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Heller leading many to see in the opinion the triumph of originalism.
x "[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning," Scalia began, announcing his intentions from the start.
xi Making use of the federal Constitution, state constitutional provisions, state legislation, dictionaries, and English case law and legal writings, the majority discussed at length the 18 th Century meaning of "the people," "arms," "keep arms," "bear arms," "keep and bear arms," and "a free state." Their conclusion was that, combined, these phrases "guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."
xii Original public meaning saw a common law right to self-defence embedded in the Second Amendment. The majority also concluded that the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State …") did not, as so many had previously claimed, limit the right to militia service but simply "announce[d] the purpose" for which the Amendment was written: "to prevent the elimination of the militia" by ensuring that individual Americans could not be disarmed. xiii Turning to consider 18 th and 19 th Century commentaries on the meaning and scope of the right encapsulated in the Amendment, the majority concluded, "virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century after its enactment interpreted the Amendment as we do."
xiv In effect, they argued any alternative reading of the history of the Founding period contradicted the weight of historical evidence both from the time and from subsequent discussion of the Amendment's meaning. ownership for military purposes and the equally clearly illegitimate purpose of gun ownership to rob a bank lay the proper line? xv Beginning, as did the majority, with the wording of the Amendment, Stevens' dissent argued that the majority failed to give proper weight to the prefatory clause. Using similar sources to the majority, Stevens argued that protection of the militia right was not just the "purpose" of the Amendment but the primary motivating factor. In support he pointed to language expressing the selfdefence reading in some state constitutions but its noticeable absence in the Second Amendment; sources contemporaneous with the Amendment which read "keep and bear arms" to have military connotations; and interpretations of "the people" which suggested the right applied not to all but to a clear subset of the population. In addition, Stevens asserted the significance of debates in the early nation about the proper division of power between the states and the federal government, arguing that this context was more important than the majority admitted. In this context, the role of the militia as an organ of state not federal power became significant and reinforced a reading of the Second Amendment as primarily concerned with a military, rather than an individual, right. Stevens gave short shrift to the significance of 18 th and 19 th Century commentaries on the Amendment's meaning, arguing, "All of these sources shed only indirect light on the question before us, and in any event offer little support for the Court's conclusions." xvi The majority's ruling, Stevens asserted, was thus not simply the imposing of an original reading of the history of the Second Amendment but a creation of a new right, influenced by an "overwrought and novel" reading of the relevant history. xvii 9 While the substantive content of Stevens' dissent sparked extensive comment, the deliberate structure of the opinion was also significant: it worked to strengthen the impression that originalism could not achieve its stated goals. Stevens followed almost exactly the structure of the majority opinion, beginning with reading the text of the amendment itself, then considering the history of the ratification period, judging the validity of post-enactment legal commentary and, finally, considering the legislative and legal background to the issue. Not only did the opinion offer a point-by-point rebuttal of the majority's position, by using the majority's framework as well as many of the same sources, the dissent made all the clearer its position as a fundamentally different reading of Second Amendment history. Scalia and Stevens might both have been equally correct in their readings, just as they might be equally wrong, but both were reasonable understandings of the history revealed in their sources. While perhaps unsurprising to historians, when read together the two opinions offered a fundamental challenge to originalism's claim to limit the role of judicial discretion in constitutional interpretation: because judgment is crucial to historical enquiry, turning to history in constitutional interpretation might provide some limit judicial discretion, for example in terms of policy-oriented decision-making, but fail to limit judicial discretion entirely.
xviii This is not to suggest that such complexities discredit originalism's role in or contribution to constitutional interpretation, only to indicate that they undermine any claim for Heller as a "triumph" of originalism.
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Claims of originalism's triumph in Heller were also weakened by the mountain of scholarship exploring the historical roots of the Second Amendment. Historians offered both support for and criticism of the historical readings offered by Scalia and Stevens, examining almost every aspect of the colonial and early American experience with guns and leaving little of the relevant history unexamined. State constitutional requirements both contemporaneous with and subsequent to ratification of the Second Amendment, the drafting history of the Second Amendment and the relative importance of language ultimately discarded by the First Congress, the exemption of Quakers and the debate over conscientious objection, the Pennsylvania Constitution, English common law, and 19 th Century sources explicating the meaning of the Second Amendment all received scholarly attention. Studies offered competing views of the proper role of preambles generally and the Second Amendment's prefatory clause in particular while providing contradictory readings of key Second Amendment phrases "the people," "arms," and "keep and bear arms," following the template established by Scalia and Stevens. xix The complexity of the history surrounding the nation's early relationship with guns and gun laws challenged the apparent simplicity offered by both Scalia and Stevens, leaving the impression that it could only be so simple if "inconvenient" elements of that history were overlooked.
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Historians and legal scholars alike openly charged the Justices and each other with picking and choosing historical facts to support their case. Criticisms of so-called "law office history," defined as "a results oriented methodology in which evidence is selectively gathered and interpreted to produce a preordained conclusion," became common in Second Amendment scholarship.
xx Such criticisms were designed, in part, to de-legitimise the conclusions reached by Scalia and Stevens in Heller while also challenging the growing body of legal and historical scholarship with which the authors disagreed. Collectively, the complexity of the historical picture and the methodological criticisms inherent in claims of "law office history" implied, and sometimes explicitly stated, that despite the Court's claims for an originalist approach to the Second Amendment, the Justices were simply playing politics with history.
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Equally damaging for Heller's originalist legacy was that a number of leading conservatives also criticised the ruling. Federal judge Richard Posner decried Scalia's "faux originalism" in an article for the New Republic just two months after Heller was decided. xxi In a speech before the Federalist Society in November, leading conservative law professor Nelson Lund took Scalia to task for his poor and inconsistent use of history and for ignoring original meaning. xxii The following year, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson offered arguably the most stinging rebuke to the Heller majority by comparing it to conservatives' bête noir: the Court's 1973 abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade. Not only did the ruling fail to adhere to a conservative judicial methodology, according to Wilkinson, it actually "encourages Americans to do what conservative jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts." xxiii On the surface, Heller represented the epitome of originalism that conservative legal scholars had been advocating for more than two decades; conservative critics asserted that surface was as deep as it went and that the Heller majority had singularly failed to correctly adhere to an originalist methodology. Not only was Heller not good originalism but, according to Wilkinson, it revealed exactly what liberal critics of the approach claimed: that it "is not determinate enough to constrain judges' discretion to decide cases based on the outcomes they prefer." 
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Criticism of the Court, whether from academics, practitioners of law, or the public, has historically had little influence in keeping the Court away from particular issues. Roe v. Wade and the abortion debate is only one example. But the criticisms of Heller challenged not only the result but the majority's entire methodology. Scalia described Heller as the greatest "vindication of originalism," and commentators have consistently recognised the importance of originalism for Heller and the significance of Heller for originalism. xxv But the combined response to Heller ensured it was far from the triumph that Scalia claimed. The conflict within its pages between the history offered by Scalia and Stevens revealed clearly that reaching back into the past and finding the relevant history might not, by itself, provide the necessary answers, especially when that history is contested. The subsequent historical scholarship only confirmed the complexity of Second Amendment history, and complexity made it possible that judgment, whether deliberate or inadvertent, played a role in Heller, in contradiction to originalism's stated intentions. Scalia himself appeared to recognise that the combination of Stevens' dissent and the weight of subsequent scholarship had weakened the rationale in Heller when he commented to Marcia Coyle in 2011 that, "We won't apply that reasoning in the next case. Very disappointing."
xxvi The irony of Heller for conservatives and originalists, then, is that the case which in its fundamental approach appeared to be the epitome of originalist jurisprudence ultimately weakened originalism in its Second Amendment context, requiring gun rights supporters to look for alternative justifications for their policy positions.
14 2. An Individual Right
15
Before Heller, one of the leading debates about the Second Amendment involved questions about its scope: did it, as gun rights advocates asserted, protect a broad individual right to bear arms, or, as gun control advocates claimed, did the prefatory clause establish a limited collective right linked to participation in the militia or its modern equivalent? In a hugely influential 1989 Yale Law Journal article, Sanford Levinson argued that the Second Amendment embodied an individual right to bear arms, and that this was "embarrassing" to liberals who failed to take this meaning seriously. xxviii The individual rights position of the Standard Model gained increased support as gun rights advocates, seeking to liberalise state and national gun laws, drew on its positions for intellectual legitimacy in the political realm. As the nation became more politically conservative, gun rights advocates saw the potential for success in an argument which emphasised the role of the individual and limited government and tied both to the nation's founding. But claims by Lund and others that the Standard Model had won out came notwithstanding the significant scholarship which challenged the individual rights position and offered alternatives in the form of collective or civic rights arguments.
xxix Equally supported by strong historical and legal scholarship, such views were not, as the "Standard" Model implied, intellectual outsiders, although supported by fewer scholars. By the time of Heller, all theories continued to attract support within the legal, academic, and political realms.
Amendment guaranteed an individual, not a collective, right to gun ownership. xxx The National Rifle Association, the nation's largest gun rights organisation, clearly interpreted Heller in this way. "The Second Amendment as an individual right now becomes a real permanent part of American constitutional law," declared Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre.
xxxi The Association's chief lobbyist, Chris Cox, echoed the sentiment, calling Heller a "monumental decision ... This has put politicians on notice that this is a fundamental right ... It can't be rationed. It can't be unduly restricted on the whims of local officials." xxxii Cox's comments hinted at another position that many gun rights supporters saw as reinforced by Heller: that the individual right protected by the Second Amendment was absolute and inviolable. One does not necessarily have to agree with Patrick Charles' 2015 assessment that, "it was not until after Heller that the absolutist view of the Second Amendment became a fixture within the political discourse," to agree that many nonetheless used Heller's emphasis on an individual right to defend an absolutist position.
xxxiii Speeches by leading conservatives, including Mitch McConnell, Rick Santorum, and Sarah Palin emphasised such arguments and the 2012 Republican National Platform asserted that gun licences and registration, limited capacity magazines, and regulation of ammunition must be opposed with equal force as attempts to ban outright certain classes of weapons. xxxiv
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However, the Heller opinion included a significant caveat that limited gun rights advocates' ability to link Heller's support for an individual right to an absolutist interpretation of the Second Amendment. "Like most rights," Scalia wrote for the majority, "the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited." In a passage that has confused many scholars, infuriated some gun rights supporters, and given hope to many gun control advocates, the opinion continued: "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." xxxv Criticised by liberals and conservatives alike as inconsistent with an originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment and as lacking discussion within the pages of the opinion, the majority's recognition of the constitutional legitimacy of some regulations on gun ownership represented a significant limitation to the scope of the individual right.
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Why in an opinion so self-consciously originalist and so clearly committed to an individual right to bear arms did the majority offer exceptions that potentially limited both? The rationale for the list of acceptable gun regulations is unclear from the pages of Heller, but can be understood in the context of the general working of the Court. First, the position was consistent with the Court's understanding of limits to other fundamental rights.
xxxvi The Court has never found any right to be absolute in any and all circumstances. Second, it is possible that the language was inserted to gain or keep the five-Justice majority. While Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas had been consistent advocates for an originalist perspective, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Alito and Anthony Kennedy often looked to other sources and may not have been entirely convinced by an entirely originalist argument.
xxxvii As Adam Winkler commented, "the originalists on the Court had to sell their originalist souls to survive." xxxviii Third, the comments can be read as a response to the dissenters' concerns about the potential dangers of an unlimited right to gun ownership. xxxix Challenged by claims that the Court's ruling would lead to inconsistent decisions, policy-making by judges, and increased danger to law-abiding Americans, the majority sought to defend their approach and dispel such claims by indicating limits to the scope of their holding. Fourth is the question of public legitimacy. The exact relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court is unclear but most scholars agree that the Court is rarely out of line with public opinion for long and the Justices are aware that the Court's institutional legitimacy is threatened when making decisions which challenge public opinion. xl Studies suggest that most Americans support both an individual right to own guns for self-defence and reasonable gun regulations; thus a ruling challenging either of these might lead to a public backlash against the Court.
xli A rational actor, seeking to preserve their influence in the most effective way, might judge that conceding on the issue of reasonable, alreadyexisting regulations while pressing a preferred reading of the broad right in general, might offer the best way to ensure continued legitimacy and the opportunity to revisit the issue at a later date.
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The full significance of the Heller majority's acceptance of limits on gun ownership became clearer with subsequent events. The vast majority of courts that upheld gun regulations against legal challenges did so using the list of acceptable restrictions offered by Scalia. By March 2015, more than nine hundred cases had been heard at state and federal level and, while not all laws survived the challenge, the vast majority were upheld by the courts.
xlii Among the laws upheld were those restricting gun ownership by convicted felons, drug addicts, those with a history of mental illness, and individuals convicted of domestic violence charges; restricting access to "unusual" weapons including sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, grenades, pipe bombs, and assault weapons; preventing carrying of guns in sensitive places such as schools, parks, and government buildings; requiring gun owners to obtain a licence and permitting restrictions on issuing of such licences; regulating storage of weapons; requiring background checks before the sale of firearms; and outlawing the sale of firearms to minors. xliii On the few occasions when federal courts struck down gun regulations, the level of commentary indicated their unusual nature. xliv Thus while they were no more than dicta, legal writings with no binding force, subsequent Second Amendment litigation partially bore out the 2009 prediction made by Denis Henigan, then Vice President for Law and Policy of gun control advocacy group the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, that Scalia's "laundry list" of potentially acceptable regulations were "likely to be among the most influential dicta in the Court's history."
xlv Although in a 2013 petition to the Supreme Court, the National Rifle Association claimed that lower federal courts had been engaging in "massive resistance" to the Court's rulings in Heller and McDonald, their argument overlooked the fact that the foundation of the majority of lower court decisions upholding restrictions on gun ownership and use rested explicitly on the reasoning offered by the majority in Heller.
xlvi Heller itself then undermined the ability of gun rights advocates to equate an individual right with an unlimited right.
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The listed exceptions in Scalia's majority opinion had something in common: they were all designed to protect the vulnerable in society from the danger inherent in firearms when misused. As such they bore a striking similarity, in impact if not in approach, to the reasoning offered by Justice Breyer in dissent. Curiously absent from the initial debate about Heller, drowned out by "the titanic clash of the competing historical visions" offered by Scalia and Stevens, Breyer offered a clear, compelling alternative way of understanding the Court's role in interpreting the Second Amendment. xlvii That role, Breyer asserted, was to balance the interests of gun owners against the interests of states in protecting their populations from danger, "with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter." xlviii In emphasising a public safety rationale, Breyer drew on an argument at least as old as the Second Amendment: the so-called police powers doctrine recognises as important and legitimate the state interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Discussing in some detail the statistics on gun crime and gun deaths considered by the District of Colombia, in particular statistics about gun crime in urban areas, Breyer presented the challenged law as a reasoned and reasonable action by the District in response to a particular local problem deemed to threaten public safety. Reasonable people might disagree about the proper approach to that problem, argued Breyer, but it was not the Court's job to judge whether the path chosen was correct or otherwise, only whether it fell within the legislature's authority. Because studies on gun control could neither show such laws were entirely ineffective nor that the legislative judgments were "incorrect," the District's reasoning was entitled to considerable weight when judging the law's constitutionality, something, Breyer argued, the majority had failed to adequately consider.
xlix Dismissed by Scalia's majority opinion, Breyer's rationale in defence of the state's police powers nevertheless provided a clear framework for assessing the public safety rationale that was implicit in the majority's list of acceptable gun control regulations.
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The frequency of mass shooting events in the US after Heller gave added force to an approach which read Breyer's public safety rationale into the gun regulations accepted by the Heller majority. In defending its 2013 assault weapons ban against a legal challenge by the NRA, the town of Highland Park, Illinois explicitly drew on recent events. Directly referencing the 2012 cinema shooting in Aurora, Colorado, the January 2013 shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in Casas Adobes, Arizona, and the shootings at Santa Monica College, California in June the same year, the city's brief to the Court argued: "Highland Park is a vibrant, suburban community with a number of locations and events susceptible to a mass shooting … The record below established that mass shootings incidents occur too frequently in the United States, and that it is reasonable for a municipality susceptible to such events to want to avoid even a single one."
l Both the mayor and the chief of police testified that such events played a role in the discussion of the city's ordinance, evidenced in the language of the ordinance itself: "recent incidents in Aurora, Colorado; Newtown, Connecticut; Tucson, Arizona; and Santa Monica, California demonstrate that gun violence is not limited to urban settings, but is also, tragically, a reality in many suburban and small town locations as well."
li Thus subsequent events gave greater force and resonance to the public safety rationale that was only implicit in Heller but to which the majority's recognition of some restrictions opened the door. of the magazine's editor-in-chief. The same year Colorado Senators John Morse and Angela Giron were subject to recall elections as a result of their support for tougher gun regulations in the aftermath of the shootings in Aurora and Newtown. lii The absolutist view was also apparent in the responses by Republicans to President Obama's 2016 executive actions to strengthen the nation's gun laws. Texas Senator Ted Cruz called the actions unconstitutional and explicitly linked gun control to "government control," Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan accused Obama of "undermin[ing] liberty," and almost every Republican presidential candidate asserted that the actions violated the Second Amendment. liii Such absolutism was not shared by all Republicans or by all gun rights supporters but it was increasingly common in the public and political debate about guns in the US. And it was, in part, based on Heller's assertion of an individual right in the Second Amendment, shifting the debate from individual versus collective rights to a focus on the extent of the individual right. It was a misinterpretation since Heller also permitted reasonable restrictions on gun ownership, but it was an argument made available by the Heller majority. Wade, just as anti-abortion campaigners found great success in targeting legislatures, so too the gun rights lobby's greatest successes came in using the individual rights argument outside of the nation's courts. Encouraging or pressuring legislatures to repeal existing gun laws to make gun ownership and use easier has a major procedural advantage: advocates of stricter gun laws cannot bring Second Amendment lawsuits which claim that gun laws are not strict enough, thus effectively limiting access to the courts as a remedy. Gun rights advocates found particular success in the area of weapons outside the home which became a particular focus after Heller. At least twelve states extended and expanded laws to permit the open or concealed carry of weapons in public, including in areas such as schools and parks that might conceivably fall under the "sensitive places" exception accepted in Heller. liv While courts continued to frustrate gun rights advocates' attempts to create an almost unlimited right to gun ownership, in the legislative and public arena advocates had much more success with an individual rights argument.
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The irony of this is that legislative action is what Breyer had supported in dissent in Heller. Breyer's approach allowed for the kind of deference to legislative decision-making that in Michigan and Iowa and a dozen other states led to the loosening of restrictions on carrying weapons in public. While gun rights supporters may not have liked the conclusion to which he came in relation to the District's laws, the same reasoning defended the actions of those states which moved towards greater accessibility and whose actions the NRA and others lauded. lv Justice Stevens also indicated the importance of the role of the political process. " [N] o-one has suggested," he wrote, "that the political process is not working exactly as it should in mediating the debate between the advocates and opponents of gun control."
lvi Gun rights and gun control advocates who continued their political and legislative battle to define the proper reach of the Second Amendment were thus supported, in significant part, by the dissenters in Heller. Although there are no definitive rules regarding when the Supreme Court will agree to hear a case, one major guide has traditionally been a disagreement among the lower courts regarding the proper interpretation of federal legislation or provisions of the Constitution.
lix In such a situation, laws intended to apply to all citizens are interpreted in different ways in different places undermining the intent of equal application. Arguably the simplest explanation, then, for the Court's continued refusal to hear argument in the gun rights cases appealed to it was that no such split existed among the lower courts. In states and localities where stricter gun laws were enacted, legal challenges were largely rejected by courts relying specifically on the wording of Heller. lx Although such rulings might be criticised for reading the letter and not the spirit of Heller, an approach described as courts "narrowing from below," the consistent reference to Heller and the narrow reading of its holding meant little disagreement among lower state and federal courts across the US.
lxi In the absence of a major split between lower courts in different parts of the country, the Justices were less likely to feel compelled to intercede.
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Considered from a different perspective, however, the combination of legal and political battles over the extent of the Second Amendment right led to a patchwork of regulations across the country. While places such as the District of Colombia, suburban Chicago, and San Francisco enacted strict gun control measures which were upheld by the courts, many states, including Texas, Tennessee, and Oklahoma, passed legislation easing older restrictions on owning, carrying, and using firearms. Both options were justified by references to Heller. On one hand this could be argued as the essence of federalism in action, allowing states and localities the freedom to experiment with local laws and regulations best suited to their circumstances. lxii It might also be interpreted as an example of judicial restraint: the Court recognising that the broad parameters of Heller permitted some degree of divergence among local regulations. On the other hand, the practical result, of fewer regulations in some parts of the country and stricter regulations in others, looked a lot like the result that might emerge from a disagreement among the lower courts, suggesting the absence of a circuit court split may not be the only reason for the Court's reluctance to intervene. lxiv Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois saw a challenge to the city's ordinance banning ownership of assault weapons and high-capacity magazines within the city limits. As in Jackson, the Court's refusal to hear the case left the law intact. In Friedman, Thomas accused lower courts of "noncompliance with our Second Amendment precedents" and described the Seventh Circuit's rationale as a "crabbed reading" of Heller "relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right."
lxv Given the concern expressed by Thomas and Scalia that lower courts were causing confusion by ignoring Kennedy had in their respective careers inclined towards the use of history when necessary without being bound to it. In the aftermath of Heller in particular, the avalanche of criticism from liberals and conservatives alike, as well as the voluminous historical work which made the question of Second Amendment history so problematic for the Court, it is at least possible that the Court's non-originalists became less sure of its usefulness or value in future Second Amendment cases. Among the dissenters, Breyer obtained the support of Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, providing a possible four votes to grant a hearing in a future Second Amendment case until Souter and Stevens retired in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The lack of action after McDonald indicated either that Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor did not subscribe to the views offered by Breyer or that there was no sense that they could attract the necessary fifth vote from among the former Heller and McDonald majority. Either way, the Court's continued silence on the Second Amendment suggested that no theory of interpretation attracted a clear majority on the Court. Since a fractured opinion would potentially do more harm than good, to Second Amendment jurisprudence and to the Court's reputation, the Justices' silence might best be interpreted less as a "shameless refusal" to discuss the issue but as an exercise in necessary judicial restraint.
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While the eight years between the ruling in Heller and the death of the majority opinion's author is not a particularly long time for the Court to remain away from the debate, its consistent refusal to hear another Second Amendment case in that period is at least notable. First, the Court itself agreed that Heller and then McDonald were only the start of the process of Second Amendment interpretation hinting, although not suggesting outright, that continued engagement with the issue in the near future was likely. The Court's subsequent silence stood in contrast to the hint of future action. Second, although there was no division between lower courts on fundamental principles of law, in practice differences in legal and legislative approaches across the country resulted in a patchwork of Second Amendment interpretation that looked very similar to something a circuit split might create. At the very least it suggested that Heller had been interpreted in different ways in different parts of the country. Third, Thomas and Scalia's 2015 dissents from denial of certiorari, combined with objections from gun right supporters including the NRA and the variety of actions taken on gun laws across the country, suggested that the legacy of Heller was, if not outright confusion, then at least deepening divides over the key issues it raised, issues which the Court was uniquely placed to address. That it chose to remain outside of the debate, despite conditions which suggested it might take action, is both important and one of the more surprising legacies of Heller and McDonald. 32 
Conclusion

33
In 2007, the year before the Supreme Court agreed to hear Heller, Mark Tushnet argued that "the Constitution can't end the battle over guns."
lxvii The aftermath of Heller proved him right. No Court scholars would expect that a ruling from the Court in a culture wars case would end the debate over a given issue but the impact of Heller on Second Amendment debates was particularly surprising. Offering, on the surface, exactly what gun rights advocates had campaigned for, Heller led to the limiting or undermining of key tenets of the gun control argument, whether as a result of the debates about the use of history by Scalia and Stevens or in Heller's recognition that an individual right to bear arms for self-defence could be legitimately limited in a number of important ways. Such results were not only surprising but had significant implications for Second Amendment debates.
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Of the Court's absence from the debate over the Second Amendment before Heller, Adam Winkler wrote: "the result was anything but a gradual move towards consensus. Instead, the Court's absence allowed the forces of unreason to command the field … extremists were free to cast the Second Amendment in their own preferred terms … Neither side felt the need to compromise because total victory was still possible." lxviii Charles' observations of the rise of Second Amendment absolutism in the political realm suggested the Court's absence from the debate resulted in the same polarization postHeller that Winkler identified in pre-Heller politics. The response to President Obama's January 2016 executive orders only reinforced Charles' conclusions. The result of Heller was not, as Winkler hoped, a more reasonable discussion about reducing gun violence in the US, but instead continued, and perhaps more extreme, polarization. lxix Those differences were increasingly reflected in the nation's patchwork of gun laws, only further emphasising differences between red and blue states or even, in the case of San Francisco and Highland Park, between red and blue towns and counties. In such a context, the vast majority of courts which upheld gun control laws using Heller as a foundation appeared to be, or could be portrayed as, making decisions based less on legal principles and more on political grounds clothed in the language of the law. Both only intensified the battle.
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Meanwhile, the shifting politics and the controversy over Heller's legal foundations appeared to be keeping the Court, arguably the only institution able to clarify the meaning of Heller, out of the debate. Despite the appeals by Thomas and Scalia in 2015, the Court's majority remained unwilling to re-enter a debate for which it was partly responsible. The exact reasons for the Court's absence remain obscure, and are likely to remain so until the papers of the current Justices are made available to scholars, an event several decades in the future. But to those familiar with the Court, knowledge of its usual working practices provide some hints. The signs are that no theoretical or jurisprudential approach drew a majority of the Justices. The significant criticism of the approaches taken by Scalia and Stevens in Heller, the alternative offered by Breyer, and subsequent personnel change on the Court played a role in shifting the Justices' alliances. Nothing, from the Court's perspective, was to be gained by entering the debate without a clear majority for a particular approach. Equally, in the absence of a split between the lower courts, nothing compelled the Justices to become involved either.
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At the time of writing (November 2016), the future direction of Second Amendment jurisprudence remains unclear. Donald Trump promised in his election campaign to appoint justices who supported Second Amendment rights; with the Senate under Republican control a successful nomination seems likely. But the impact that person might have on the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence remains in the realms of speculation and is likely to do so for some time.
lxx The unanimous per curiam opinion in Caetano v. Massachusetts, handed down by the Court a month after Scalia's death, indicated eight Justices were committed to Heller as precedent, but, as the experience of the lower courts indicates, Heller can mean different things to different people and could just as easily result in a broad or narrow reading of Second Amendment rights.
lxxi Caetano, striking down a Massachusetts law banning possession of stun guns, provided little indication of future action by the Justices since the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts so clearly employed a rationale rejected in Heller. While a greater attention to history in law may well be one of Scalia's greatest legacies, originalism remains a controversial judicial philosophy and one that does not appear to command a majority on the Court, a situation unlikely to change as the result of the appointment of one additional Justice. Which approach does eventually draw together a new majority will be crucial for the future direction of the Second Amendment. As and when the Court does grant certiorari in a new gun rights case, whether prompted by a circuit split or by the emergence of a consensus within the Court, the ruling will be handed down in a situation that is arguably even more polarised as a result of the debate over Heller. Thus any decision is even less likely to end the battle over the Second Amendment.
37
That the debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment will change and develop over time is unquestioned, that the Court will eventually rejoin the debate assured, although whether that is sooner or later remains to be seen. But irrespective of the long term legacy of Heller and McDonald, the early responses to both mark a particular moment in the debate about the extent of gun rights and the scope of the Second Amendment in the United States in the early 21 st Century, one which shows that the impact of a Court decision may not always be the one that is most expected. vi. Conservatives were particularly concerned that the Justices had, or would, decide cases based on their personal political and policy preferences rather than strictly on the dictates of the law. For a good introduction to the role of personal policy preferences see Jeffrey Segal xxxv. District of Columbia v. Heller 554 US 570, 626-627 (2008) .
xxxvi. Freedom of speech is one example. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in a frequently misquoted 1919 majority opinion: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. US 249 US 47, 52 (1919) . Individuals and groups may be restricted to airing their views at certain times of the day, in certain designated spaces, and certain modes of expression might be prevented (so-called "time, place, manner restrictions") in order to protect public convenience, order, and safety. 
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